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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In an earlier criminal proceeding, Juan Gonzales pled guilty to a single count of 
lewd conduct with a minor. In that case, Mr. Gonzales' counsel never sought to obtain 
an independent (confidential) psychosexual evaluation for Mr. Gonzales, and he never 
advised Mr. Gonzales to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to silence and not 
participate in the court-ordered (unprivileged) evaluation. Consequently, Mr. Gonzales 
participated in the court-ordered evaluation, revealing a significant amount of highly 
prejudicial information. Based largely on this unfavorable evaluation, Mr. Gonzales 
received a prison sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed. 
Subsequently, Mr. Gonzales initiated the present case by filing a petition for post-
conviction relief and filing a motion seeking the appointment of post-conviction counsel. 
In his petition, Mr. Gonzales alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of 
counsel insofar as his attorney failed to obtain an independent (confidential) 
psychosexual evaluation or advise him not to participate in the court-ordered evaluation. 
However, the district court denied Mr. Gonzales' motion for appointment of counsel and 
summarily dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief. 
On appeal, Mr. Gonzales asserts that the district court erred in denying his 
motion and dismissing his petition because, in fact, he presented prima facie evidence 
of ineffective assistance of counselor, at the very least, the possibility of a valid claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. He asks that this Court vacate the district court's 
dismissal order and remand his case for an evidentiary hearing or, at a minimum, the 
appointment of post-conviction counsel. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On August 27, 2007, Juan Gonzales was charged with two counts of lewd 
conduct and one count of rape based on allegations that he had sexual contact with his 
teenage daughter. (No. 35211 R., ppA-5.) Following a preliminary hearing, he was 
bound over on both counts of lewd conduct, as well as a reduced charged of attempted 
rape. (R., pp.30, 31-32.) 
Approximately four months after he was originally charged (on or about 
January 4, 2008), Mr. Gonzales entered into a plea agreement whereby he pled guilty to 
a single count of lewd conduct with a minor, for manual-to-genital contact, and, in 
exchange, the other two charges were dismissed. (No. 35211 Plea Tr., p.3, L.17 - pA, 
L.8, p.8, L.22 - p.9, L.15, p.13, L.19 - p.14, L.5.) Upon accepting Mr. Gonzales' plea, 
the district court ordered a pre-sentence investigation report, as well as a psychosexual 
evaluation; however, it also advised Mr. Gonzales of his right, based on the Fifth 
Amendment, not to participate in either. (No. 35211 Plea Tr., p.i0, L.16 - p.11, L.8, 
p.14, L.11-p.16, L.5; No. 35211 R., ppA0-41.) In response to the district court's order, 
Mr. Gonzales' counsel requested that the psychosexual evaluation be ordered to be 
performed by a Dr. Dodgen; however, the district court ordered that a Dr. Smith conduct 
the evaluation instead. (No. 35211 Plea Tr., p.14, L.18 - p.16, L.5.) 
Mr. Gonzales' counsel never sought out a private psychosexual evaluation-
whether through Dr. Dodgen or some other provider. 1 (No. 36625 R., p.8.) Nor did 
1 Although the record does not disclose why retained counsel never sought out a private 
psychosexual evaluation for his client, the failure in this regard appears not to have 
been based on a lack of funding, as counsel was privately retained (No. 35211 
R., pp.13-14) and Mr. Gonzales ended up paying for the court-ordered evaluation (No. 
36625 R., pA4). 
2 
counsel ever advise Mr. Gonzales to invoke his right to silence in the court-ordered 
psychosexual evaluation with Dr. Smith. (No. 36625 R., p.8.) Thus, Mr. Gonzales 
participated in the evaluation with Dr. Smith, as well as a related polygraph examination 
with Chip Morgan. (See generally Psychosexual Evaluation Report (hereinafter, PSE); 
Polygraph Reportl 
During the polygraph examination and his interview with Dr. Smith, Mr. Gonzales 
ultimately disclosed that he had sexual contact with his daughter on numerous 
occasions, and, further, that this contact included more than the mere manual-to-genital 
contact that he had admitted in pleading guilty. (PSE, pp.2, 3; Polygraph Report, p.2.) 
Specifically, Mr. Gonzales admitted to "many" instances of sexual contact, described 
two instances of completed vaginal intercourse and five additional instances of 
attempted vaginal intercourse, and disclosed one instance of completed oral sex and 
one instance of attempted oral sex. (Polygraph Report, p.2.) He also admitted to 
sexual intercourse with two other underage victims (ages sixteen to seventeen years 
old) as an adult (age 32). (Polygraph Report, p.2.) Even then the polygrapher opined 
that Mr. Gonzales had been deceptive (leading to the inference that there are still 
undisclosed victims or aggravating circumstances about Mr. Gonzales' criminal sexual 
past). (Polygraph Report, pp.4-5.) Thus, Dr. Smith characterized Mr. Gonzales as a 
hebephile. (PSE, pp.9, 11.) In addition, in light of Mr. Gonzales' attempts to conceal 
and minimize his sexual misconduct, the known scope of that misconduct, his alcohol 
problems, and his apparent lack of empathy for his daughter, Dr. Smith opined that 
2 The PSE is included in the Clerk's Record in Case No. 35211 as a sealed exhibit. The 
Polygraph Report is attached to the PSE. 
3 
Mr. Gonzales presents a moderate risk of re-offense. (PSE, pp.8-9, 10. Compare PSE, 
p.2 (Mr. Gonzales minimizing the number of incidents with his daughter) and p.3 
(Mr. Gonzales minimizing the type of contact with his daughter) and p.5 (Mr. Gonzales 
claiming that none of sexual partners were underage), with Polygraph Report, p.2 
(revealing significantly more sexual misconduct) and Polygraph Report, ppA-5 
(revealing apparent deception in even the more expansive sexual history provided to 
the polygrapher).) 
Dr. Smith then forwarded his report directly to the prosecution (as well as the 
district court). (See PSE, p.1; No. 35211 Sent. Tr., p.3, L.24 - pA, L.2.) Thus, his 
conclusions were then picked up on by the pre-sentence investigator and repeatedly 
highlighted in the pre-sentence investigation report (hereinafter, PSI). (PSI, pp.1 0-11, 
13-14.) 
Mr. Gonzales was sentenced on March 3, 2008. (See generally No. 35211 Sent. 
Tr.) At that hearing, the district court undoubtedly relied upon Dr. Smith's damning 
report. (No, 36625 R., pA7 ("The court did rely on the evaluation conducted by 
Dr. Smith .... "); see, e.g., No. 35211 Sent. Tr., p.16, LS.7-9 ("The court has reviewed in 
detail the presentence investigation report, as well as the psychosexual evaluation 
conducted by Dr. Smith."), p.16, LS.20-21 ("The court has focused a great deal on what 
Dr. Smith's recommendations are."), p.17, Ls.1-3 ("In cases of this type, given the 
recommendation by Dr. Smith, the court does not believe that the rider program is 
appropriate.").) In fact, the PSE appears to have been the single biggest factor 
underlying the sentence ultimately imposed (and ordered into execution) by the district 
court (twenty years, with five years fixed): 
4 
The court has focused a great deal on what Dr. Smith's 
recommendations are, Dr. Smith does note that you are a moderate risk 
to reoffend, Dr. Smith does note that at the present time you are not a 
candidate for outpatient treatment and that you're a candidate for 
residential treatment. 
In cases of this type, given that recommendation by Dr. Smith, the 
court does not believe that the rider program is appropriate, As we all 
know and this court has been told many times by the Department of 
Corrections, the rider program is not a treatment program for sex 
offenders, It is merely an assessment to further evaluate whether the 
defendant is an appropriate candidate for outpatient treatment. 
Dr. Smith has done a complete and thorough examination, The 
court is concerned over the fact that, Mr. Gonzales, you were deceptive in 
your polygraph, It's clear that when you were interviewed for the PSI, 
when you were initially interviewed by Dr. Smith for purposes of his 
evaluation, that you were minimizing the nature and extent of your 
behavior with your daughter, and it wasn't until the polygraph that the truth 
really came out. And I think, in part, that's why Dr. Smith believes that 
you're not an appropriate candidate for outpatient treatment at this time, 
So, for those reasons, the court does not believe that you're an 
appropriate candidate for probation presently, the court does not believe 
that you're an appropriate candidate for the rider. Therefore, as to the 
charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under sixteen, a 
felony, the court will impose court costs of $297,50, The court is not going 
to impose any fine, 
The court, however, is going to impose penitentiary time of twenty 
years, with five years fixed, fifteen years indeterminate, not to exceed 
twenty, , , , 
, , , For the reasons previously stated by the court, [neither] the 
retained jurisdiction [program] nor probation is appropriate, 
(No, 35211 Sent. Tr., p,16, L,20 - p, 18, L10,) 
Mr. Gonzales timely appealed, (No, 35211 R" pp,59-61,) On appeal, he argued 
that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence; 
however, in a per curiam opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Gonzales' 
sentence, State v, Gonzales, No, 35211,2009 Unpublished Opinion No, 318 (Ct. App, 
Jan, 12,2009), A remittitur was issued on March 31, 2009, 
5 
On April 15, 2009, Mr. Gonzales, acting pro se, filed a verified petition for post-
conviction relief and a supporting affidavit. (No. 36625 R., pp.2-9.) Together, these 
documents alleged that Mr. Gonzales had received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
his criminal case insofar as his attorney failed to obtain a private psychosexual 
evaluation from Dr. Dodgen (which would have remained privileged unless or until the 
defense decided to disclose it) and failed to counsel him not to participate in the 
unprivileged evaluation with Dr. Smith. (No. 36625 R., ppA, 7-8.) Mr. Gonzales, thus, 
sought an order reopening his criminal case, sealing the existing psychosexual 
evaluation report in that case, and remanding the case for a new sentencing hearing 
(wherein Mr. Gonzales might have an opportunity to present a psychosexual evaluation 
report from an independent expert, such as Dr. Dodgen) before a different district 
judge3 (See No. 36625 R., ppA, 8.) 
Along with his petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Gonzales also filed a motion 
for appointment of counsel. (See Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of 
Counsel (Conflict Free) (Apr. 15,2009); see also Motion and affidavit for Permission to 
3 Although Mr. Gonzales' verified petition and affidavit spoke specifically of Dr. Dodgen 
(as opposed to a privately-retained expert more generally), reading those filings 
liberally, as the district court should have done, and as this Court must do, cf. Plant v. 
State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 2006) ("[W]hen a motion for the 
appointment of counsel is presented, every inference is to be drawn in the petitioner's 
favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be expected to know 
how to properly allege the necessary facts); Goff v. State, 91 Idaho 36, 37, 415 P.2d 
679, 680 (1966) (holding that a petition for writ of habeas corpus should be liberally 
construed, especially where it is prepared by a prisoner who is untrained in the law), it is 
clear that Mr. Gonzales' claim has less to do with anything that Dr. Dodgen might have 
said, and much more to do with the fact that Dr. Dodgen would have been a privately-
retained defense expert and, thus, anything he said would have been privileged. (See 
No. 36625 R., p.8 ("Counsel should have just had me evaluated by Dr. Dodgen, where 
the results of the evaluation would have been privileged unless favorable and, therefore, 
voluntarily disclosed by me and Counsel .... ").) 
6 
Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Fees (Prisoner) (Apr. 15, 2009) (providing 
additional support for Mr. Gonzales' claim of indigency).)4 
The district court did not hesitate to issue a lengthy notice of its intent to deny 
Mr. Gonzales' motion for appointment of counsel and summarily dismiss his petition for 
post-conviction relief in its entirety.5 (No. 36625 R., pp.10-22.) In its notice, the district 
court construed Mr. Gonzales' petition as presenting three distinct claims for relief: 
The petitioner asserts that his counsel's ineffectiveness is based on 
the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 
P.3d 833 (2007), and his claims can be summarized as follows: 
(1) His attorney did not advise against participating in the 
presentence investigation inteNiew; 
(2) His attorney did not advised [sic] against participating in the 
psychosexual evaluation with Dr. Smith; and 
(3) His attorney failed to have him evaluated by Dr. Dodgen. 
(No. 36625 R., p.16.) It then went on to say that the first claim (concerning the pre-
sentence investigation inteNiew) was frivolous because neither the Fifth nor the Sixth 
Amendment has any application in pre-sentence investigation inteNiews and, besides, 
Mr. Gonzales had been apprised of his right to silence at his change of plea hearing 
anyway.6 (No. 36625 R., pp.3, 16-17.) The district court then stated that the second 
4 Both the motion for appointment of counsel, and the motion for permission to proceed 
on partial payment of fees, are attached to Mr. Gonzales' Motion to Augment Record, 
which is filed contemporaneously herewith. 
5 That notice was filed on April 20, 2009, five days after Mr. Gonzales' verified petition 
was filed. (See No. 36625 R., p.10.) 
6 The district court cited Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467, 180 P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2007), 
for the proposition that the neither the Fifth Amendment right to silence, nor the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, has any application in a pre-sentence investigation 
inteNiew. (No. 36625 R., pp.16-17.) While the district court's citation to Stuart was 
appropriate for its contention regarding the Sixth Amendment, Stuart does not support 
the district court's claim that the Fifth Amendment right to silence has no application in a 
pre-sentence investigation inteNiew. See generally Stuart, 145 Idaho 467, 180 P.3d 
7 
claim (concerning Dr. Smith's psychosexual evaluation) was frivolous because the only 
relevant inquiry is whether Mr. Gonzales was advised of the existence of his right to 
silence (as opposed to being counseled as to whether he should invoke or, instead, 
waive that right), and the transcript of Mr. Gonzales' change of plea hearing 
unequivocally showed that he was so advised (by the district court). (No. 36625 
R., pp.13, 17-19.) Finally, with regard to the third claim (concerning the lack of an 
evaluation by Dr. Dodgen), the district court observed that Mr. Gonzales could not 
demonstrate that Dr. Smith's evaluation was flawed such that it could have been 
rebutted, or that Dr. Dodgen's evaluation (had he conducted one) would have been 
favorable, and it ruled that any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is frivolous until 
such a showing is made, and, besides, the district court reasoned, Mr. Gonzales failed 
to show that the failure to contract with Dr. Dodgen was not a strategic decision on the 
partofcounsel. (No. 36625 R., pp.13, 19-21.) 
On April 30, 2009, Mr. Gonzales filed a response to the district court's notice (No. 
36625 R., pp.26-27), as well as a second affidavit, which included a 2008 letter from the 
attorney who had handled Mr. Gonzales' direct appeal7 (No. 36625 R., pp.29-33). The 
letter from appellate counsel is notable because, as a letter alerting Mr. Gonzales to a 
possible claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and explaining that claim, it should 
have put Mr. Gonzales' original petition and affidavit in context. (See No. 36625 
R., pp. 32-33.) It also should have made it exceptionally clear to the district court that 
506. In fact, the Stuart Court specifically declined to address this very issue. Id. at 469 
n.1, 180 P.3d at 508 n.1. Furthermore, although it is not relevant to any claims raised in 
this appeal (see note 8, infra), Mr. Gonzales contends that, unless the right is waived, or 
unless immunity is granted, he always has a Fifth Amendment right to silence. 
7 That appellate attorney in question was undersigned counsel, Erik Lehtinen. 
8 
Mr. Gonzales' claim was that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in his 
criminal case insofar as his attorney failed to obtain a private psychosexual evaluation 
from Dr. Dodgen (which would have remained privileged unless or until the defense 
decided to disclose it) and failed to counsel him not to participate in the unprivileged 
evaluation with Dr. Smith. (See No. 36625 R., pp.32-33.) Specifically, the letter from 
appellate counsel stated as follows: 
My concern is that Mr. Brown [defense counsel] may have rendered 
deficient performance by failing to advise you not to participate in the 
presentence investigation or the evaluation with Dr. Smith. He could have 
simply had you evaluated by Dr. Dodgen, where the results of the 
evaluation would have been privileged unless favorable and, therefore, 
voluntarily disclosed by you and Mr. Brown. I simply cannot see any 
strategic value to him advising you to waive your rights and disclose a lot 
of potentially harmful information in a non-privileged setting to Dr. Smith. 
This seems to have been a tremendous and unnecessary risk, and one 
that ended up hurting you in the end. 
(No. 36625 R., pp.32-33.) 
Again, the district court responded promptly. On May 11, 2009, the district court 
entered a 15-page order dismissing Mr. Gonzales' petition and formally denying his 
motion for appointment of counsel. (No. 36625 R., pp.34-48.) In this order, the district 
court continued to characterize Mr. Gonzales' petition as presenting the following three 
claims for relief: (1) his attorney did not advise him against participating in the 
presentence investigation interview; (2) his attorney did not advise him against 
participating in the psychosexual evaluation with Dr. Smith; and (3) his attorney failed to 
have him evaluated by Dr. Dodgen. (See, e.g., No. 36625 R., p.35.) It then analyzed 
each claim in turn, describing them all as frivolous. 
With regard to what the district court characterized as Mr. Gonzales' first claim 
(concerning the pre-sentence investigation interview), the district court concluded that 
9 
that claim was frivolous because "the right to remain silent does not apply to the 
presentence investigation interview," and because the pre-sentence investigation 
interview was not a critical stage of the proceeding where Mr. Gonzales would have 
been entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. (No. 36625 R, pp.38, 41.) 
With regard to what the district court characterized as Mr. Gonzales' second 
claim (concerning participation in Dr. Smith's psychosexual evaluation), the district court 
concluded that that claim was frivolous because: Mr. Gonzales had been informed of 
his right to silence by the district court; counsel could not have known that Dr. Smith's 
evaluation would be unfavorable (or favorable, for that matter) so Mr. Gonzales' claim 
must necessarily be the product of hindsight; the failure to advise Mr. Gonzales to 
exercise his right to silence must be presumed to have been a tactical decision on the 
part of counsel, and Mr. Gonzales cannot disprove that possibility; and the district court 
would have treated the absence of a psychosexual report in the same manner as a 
highly unfavorable report, such that it would have imposed a prison sentence even 
without the damning report from Dr. Smith. (No. 36625 R, pp.38, 41-44, 47.) 
Finally, with regard to what the district court characterized as Mr. Gonzales' third 
claim (concerning the failure to obtain an evaluation from Dr. Dodgen), the district court 
concluded that that claim was frivolous because Mr. Gonzales failed to identify any 
flaws in Dr. Smith evaluation or say what sort of favorable statements Dr. Dodgen might 
have made and, besides, Mr. Gonzales failed to disprove the district court's 
presumption that Mr. Gonzales' counsel had a strategic or tactical reason for failing to 
obtain an independent psychosexual evaluation. (No. 36625 R, pp.38, 44-45, 46, 47.) 
10 
On June 5, 2009, Mr. Gonzales, still acting pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal, 
thereby initiating the present appeal. (No. 36625 R., pp.50-52.) On appeal, 
Mr. Gonzales contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition 
and in denying his motion for appointment of counsel. Specifically, Mr. Gonzales 
asserts that, not only has he raised the possibility of a valid claim such that counsel 
should have been appointed to assist him, but he has presented prima facie evidence of 




1. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Gonzales' petition for post-
conviction relief? 





The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Gonzales' Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief Because The Petition Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Gonzales presented two closely 
connected claims for relief: (1) his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failing to seek out a private (privileged) psychosexual evaluation; and (2) his attorney 
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise him not to participate in 
the court-ordered (unprivileged) psychosexual evaluation a The district court, however, 
summarily dismissed both claims. For the reasons set forth in detail below, 
Mr. Gonzales contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claims, 
as he has presented prima facie evidence of ineffectiveness with regard to both claims. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
The United States Constitution "guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process 
Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several 
provisions of the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 
(1984). One such provision is the right to the assistance of counsel, U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense."), which has been interpreted as the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685-86. 
8 Mr. Gonzales' petition also asserted a claim concerning his counsel's failure to advise 
him not to participate in the pre-sentence investigation interview; however, 
Mr. Gonzales is not appealing the summary dismissal of that particular claim. 
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There is a two-pronged test for determining whether an attorney has rendered 
ineffective assistance in contravention of a criminal defendant's right to counsel. The 
threshold inquiry is whether counsel's performance was "deficient," i.e., whether it "fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness," as judged "under prevailing 
professional norms." Id. at 687-91. Assuming there has been deficient performance, 
the next inquiry is whether that deficient perforrnance prejudiced the defendant Id. at 
687, 691-96. In order to establish "prejudice," it need not be shown "that counsel's 
deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcorne in the case" since the "result 
of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, 
even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to 
have determined the outcome." Id. at 693-94. Instead, it need only be shown "that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different" Id. at 694. 
Under Idaho law, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised by 
the defendant in his direct appeal; however, such a claim is more appropriately asserted 
through a petition for post-conviction relief. Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 295-96, 92 
P.3d 542, 545-46 (Ct App. 2004). 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is separate and 
distinct from the underlying criminal action which led to the petitioner's conviction. 
Pe/tierv. State, 119 Idaho 454,456,808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991). It is a civil proceeding 
governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (hereinafter, UPCPA) 
(I.C. §§ 19-4901 to -4911) and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Peltier, 119 Idaho at 
456, 808 P.2d at 375. Because it is a civil proceeding, the petitioner must prove his 
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allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,816, 
892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). However, the petition initiating a post-conviction 
proceeding differs from the complaint initiating a civil action. A post-conviction petition 
is required to include more than "a short and plain statement of the claim"; it "must be 
verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and 
affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the 
application must state why such supporting evidence is not attached." Id.; I.C. § 19-
4903. "In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible 
evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." 
Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the 
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of post-conviction petitions where there are no 
genuine issues as to any material facts and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. I.C. § 19-4906(c).9 In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, 
the district court need not "accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law." Martinez, 
126 Idaho at 816-17, 892 P.2d at 491-92. However, if the petitioner presents any 
evidentiary support for his allegations, the district court must take the petitioner's 
allegations as true, at least until such time as they are controverted by the State. 
Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646, 448 P.2d 649, 652 (1968). This is so even if the 
9 Although this standard is set forth in section 19-4906(b), which deals with motions for 
summary disposition, it appears to apply to sua sponte dismissals as well. See, e.g., 
Small, 132 Idaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155 (discussing the standard for summary 
disposition under section 19-4906 generally as being whether a genuine issue of 
material fact has been presented). 
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allegations appear incredible on their face. Id. Thus, only after the State controverts 
the petitioner's allegations can the district court consider the evidence. Drapeau v. 
State, 103 Idaho 612, 651 P.2d 546 (Ct. App. 1982). But in doing so, it must still 
liberally construe the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner, 
Small, 132 Idaho at 331,971 P.2d at 1155.10 
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Small, 132 Idaho at 331,971 P.2d at 1155. 
If there is no question of fact, and if the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
dismissal can be ordered sua sponte, or pursuant to the State's motion. I.C. § 19-
4906(b), (c). 
If the district court orders dismissal sua sponte, it must first give the petitioner 
twenty days' notice and allow the petitioner to respond to the notice. I.C. § 19-4906(b). 
The purpose of this requirement is to give the petitioner an opportunity to challenge the 
decision before it is finalized. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159-60,715 P.2d 369, 
371-72 (Ct. App. 1986). Thus, this requirement is strict; it makes no difference whether 
the petitioner's claims are meritorious or not. Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho 128, 129-
30,578 P.2d 244, 245-46 (1978). Moreover, vague notice of the district court's intent to 
. 
dismiss is insufficient. The district court must be specific as to the bases for the 
intended dismissal so as to provide the petitioner with a meaningful opportunity to 
respond. Banks v. State, 123 Idaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993). It is not 
sufficient to merely recite the language from section 19-4906 and state a conclusion. 
10 The district court need not accept those of the petitioner's allegations which are 
"clearly disproved by the record." Coontz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 368, 924 P.2d 622, 
630 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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Id. If the district court fails to give the petitioner the required notice and opportunity to 
respond, or if the district court's notice is impermissibly vague, the petition must be 
reinstated. Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456-57,458,808 P.2d at 375-76,377 (failure to give 
any notice); Banks, 123 Idaho at 954,855 P.2d at 39 (notice was impermissibly vague). 
Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition will never involve the 
finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations 
of law. Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court's summary dismissal 
order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401,402-03, 128 P.3d 938, 939-40 (2006). 
Applying these standards to Mr. Gonzales' case, it ought to be apparent (for the 
reasons stated in detail below) that the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
Mr. Gonzales' petition in its entirety. 
C. Mr. Gonzales Has Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel And, Thus, Is Entitled To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claims 
Mr. Gonzales raised the following two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
in his petition for post-conviction relief: (1) his attorney was ineffective for failing to seek 
out a private (privileged) psychosexual evaluation; and (2) his attorney was ineffective 
for failing to advise him not to participate in the court-ordered (unprivileged) 
psychosexual evaluation with Dr. Smith.11 (No. 36625 R., pp.4, 7-8; see also R., pp.32-
33 (letter of appellate counsel).) These two interrelated claims are based on certain 
fundamental principles: first, once a defendant has been found guilty of a sex offense, 
competent defense counsel must not only apprise his client of his Fifth Amendment right 
to silence during the pre-sentence investigation interview and psychosexual evaluation, 
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but also advise his client as to whether the client should invoke/waive that right; second, 
to the extent that it ever may be reasonable to advise a client to waive his Fifth 
Amendment rights, competent defense counsel cannot so advise his client unless or 
until he knows what information is likely to be revealed in the interview andlor 
evaluation, and what kind of conclusions might result; and third, the only way for 
competent counsel to gather the evidence necessary to advise his client as to whether 
the client should waive his Fifth Amendment rights and participate in the pre-sentence 
investigation interview and psychosexual evaluation, or to properly prepare for 
sentencing generally, is to obtain an independent (privileged) evaluation prior to 
sentencing. Mr. Gonzales' point, quite clearly, was that had counsel acted competently 
in this regard, at a minimum, Dr. Smith's extraordinarily prejudicial report would not 
have been before the district court at the time of Mr. Gonzales' sentencing hearing. 12 
For the reasons set forth in detail below, Mr. Gonzales contends that he has 
asserted cognizable claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and presented a prima 
facie case as to each. 
11 As noted, Mr. Gonzales present no claim on appeal related to the summary dismissal 
of his claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him not to participate in 
the pre-sentence investigation interview. (See note 8, supra.) 
12 Contrary to the district court's belief, Mr. Gonzales' claim is not based on any 
speculation as to what may have been wrong with Dr. Smith's evaluation, or what any 
other expert (such as Dr. Dodgen) would have said. Rather, as noted, Mr. Gonzales 
simply asserts that, but for counsel's deficient performance, Dr. Smith's damning report 
would not have been before the district court at sentencing. 
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1. Mr. Gonzales Has Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of Ineffectiveness 
Based On Counsel's Failure To Seek Out An Independent (Privileged) 
Psychosexual Evaluation 
As noted above, in order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the petitioner must prove both prongs of the Strickland standard-deficient performance 
on the part of counsel, as well as some prejudice owing to that deficient performance. 
At the summary dismissal stage, however, the petitioner need only present prima facie 
evidence of both prongs. McKay v. State, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d _, 2010 WL 323546, 
*3-4 (Jan. 29, 2010). In this case, Mr. Gonzales has easily satisfied that standard. 
a) Mr. Gonzales Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of Deficient 
Performance 
It is well-settled in Idaho that the existence and identity of defense experts, as 
well as the statements, reports, and opinions of those experts, are protected unless or 
until the defense decides to utilize those experts in open court. See I.C.R. 16(c) & (g); 
i.R.E. 502. Accordingly, in a case in which the defendant has been found guilty of a sex 
offense, there is little or no risk that a psychosexual evaluation of the defendant 
performed by an independent expert retained for that purpose by the defense need end 
up in the district court's hands for the defendant's sentencing hearing. If the evaluation 
turns out to be favorable to the defendant, defense counsel could, and indeed should, 
offer the independent expert's testimony (or a report in lieu of live testimony), in 
mitigation at his client's sentencing hearing. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-
96 (2000) (trial counsel's failure to investigate and present substantial mitigating 
evidence deemed to be deficient performance); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
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JUSTICE, The Defense Function §§ 4-4.1 (a)13 & 4_8.1(b)14; ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Providing Defense Services § 5_1.415; NLADA, PERFORMANCE 
GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guidelines 4.1,16 8.1 (a), 17 8.3(a),18 
13 "Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the 
case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the 
penalty in the event of conviction. . .. The duty to investigate exists regardless of the 
accused's admissions or statements to defense counsel of facts constituting guilt or the 
accused's stated desire to plead guilty." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The 
Defense Function § 4-4.1 (a). 
14 "Defense counsel should present to the court any ground which will assist in reaching 
a proper disposition favorable to the accused. If a presentence report or summary is 
made available to defense counsel, he or she should seek to verify the information 
contained in it and should be prepared to supplement or challenge it if necessary. If 
there is no presentence report or if it is not disclosed, defense counsel should submit to 
the court and the prosecutor all favorable information relevant to sentencing and in an 
appropriate case. . .." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Defense 
Function § 4-8.1(b). 
15 "The legal representation plan should provide for investigatory, expert, and other 
services necessary to quality legal representation. These should include not only those 
services and facilities needed for an effective defense at trial but also those that are 
required for effective defense participation in every phase of the process." ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Providing Defense Services § 5-1.4. 
16 "Counsel has a duty to conduct an independent investigation regardless of the 
accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt. . . . 
Counsel should secure the assistance of experts where it is necessary or appropriate 
to: (A) the preparation of the defense; (B) adequate understanding of the prosecution's 
case; (C) rebut the prosecution's case." NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 4.1. 
17 "Among counsel's obligations in the sentencing process are: ... to ensure all 
reasonably available mitigating and favorable information, which is likely to benefit the 
client, is presented to the court," and "to consider the need for and availability of 
sentencing speCialists, and to seek the assistance of such specialists whenever 
possible and warranted." NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
REPRESENTATION, Guideline 8.1 (a). 
18 "In preparing for sentencing, counsel should consider the need to . .. collect 
documents and affidavits to support the defense position and, where relevant, prepare 
witnesses to testify at the sentencing hearing .... " NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES 
FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 8.3(a). 
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8.4(a),19 8.6(a),20 & 8.721 ; IDAHO RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.1.22 However, if the 
evaluation turns out to be unfavorable, such that it would be unhelpful (or even harmful) 
to the defendant if disclosed, defense counsel could simply keep the evaluation 
confidential. See State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88,97,100-01,967 P.2d 702, 711, 714-15 
(1998) (noting that privileged expert reports need not be disclosed if unfavorable to the 
defendant). In light of the tremendous potential upside to obtaining a favorable 
psychosexual evaluation that can be offered in mitigation, especially where there is 
virtually no downside risk of an unfavorable evaluation coming back to haunt the 
defendant, there is simply no tactical reason for defense counsel not to obtain 
independent psychosexual evaluations in virtually every case in which a client is 
awaiting sentencing for a sex crime.23 
19 "Counsel should ... provide to the official preparing the [presentence] report relevant 
information favorable to the client .... " NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 8.4(a). 
20 "Counsel should prepare and present to the court a defense sentencing 
memorandum where there is a strategic reason for doing so. Among the topics counsel 
may wish to include in the memorandum are: ... information favorable to the defendant 
concerning such matters as the offense, mitigating factors and relative culpability, prior 
offenses, personal background," and "information which would support a sentencing 
disposition other than incarceration, such as the potential for rehabilitation . . . ." 
NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 
8.6(a). 
21 "Counsel should be prepared at the sentencing proceeding to take the steps 
necessary to advocate fully for the requested sentence and to protect the client's 
interest. . " Where information favorable to the defendant will be disputed or 
challenged, counsel should be prepared to present supporting evidence, including 
testimony of witnesses, to establish the facts favorable to the defense." NLADA, 
PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guidelines 
8.7(a) & (d). 
22 "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation." I.R.P.C.1.1. 
23 In the average sex crime case, the only reason to forego an independent 
psychosexual evaluation might be the cost of that evaluation. Whether this reason is a 
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Moreover, without a confidential psychosexual evaluation in hand, defense 
counsel can have absolutely no idea what may come out of any such evaluation,24 and 
he can have no basis to intelligently advise his client to either invoke his Fifth 
"strategic" reason, however, is a question that this Court need not answer in this case, 
as the Record on Appeal seems to indicate that the cost of any psychosexual evaluation 
was not an issue in this case, as Mr. Gonzales did, in fact, pay for a psychosexual 
evaluation out of his own pocket-the extraordinarily prejudicial court-ordered 
evaluation performed by Dr. Smith. (No. 36625 R., p.44.) 
Because this is a case with privately-retained defense counsel and a 
psychosexual evaluation paid for by the defendant, this Court need not concern itself 
with the conflict of interest that undeniably exists between those criminal defendants 
who are represented by defenders in law firms with flat-fee public defender contracts or 
in dedicated public defender offices with fixed budgets, in which cases the attorneys 
have every financial incentive to push their clients to participate in the court-ordered 
evaluations simply because the cost of such evaluations would be borne directly by the 
government, instead of coming out of the defenders' own operating budgets (or profit 
margins). 
24 While it may be tempting to hold that defense counsel has a near-absolute right to 
rely on the representations of his client and, therefore, cannot be found to have 
rendered deficient performance by advising his client based upon those 
representations, the fact is that is not necessarily true when it comes to adviSing sex 
offenders about the risks of participating in a non-privileged psychosexual evaluation. 
First, with regard to the concern that a psychosexual evaluation (especially one 
that is coupled with a polygraph examination) may disclose additional sex crimes which 
may be extremely prejudicial at sentencing, it is no solution to say that counsel can 
simply ask his client if he has committed other acts of sexual misconduct which may 
come to light during the evaluation process. Given the stigma attached to sex offenses, 
most sex offenders tend to live in a world of denial, where they cannot admit their 
actions (or their desires) even to themselves, much less to some lawyer who they hardly 
know. This is especially true in cases where they are represented by lawyers appointed 
by, and sometimes even employed directly by, the State. 
Second, there are other risks associated with a defendant's participation in a 
psychosexual evaluation besides the concern that additional crimes will be disclosed. 
One such risk is that other highly prejudicial "deviant," albeit not illegal, sexual conduct 
will be disclosed. Thus, even if counsel could rely on his client's representations 
regarding his past criminal conduct, counsel may not know to ask the questions 
necessary to gain a full understanding of what might actually come out in the 
psychosexual evaluation. Another risk is that counsel does not have access to, or the 
ability to interpret, the diagnostic tests utilized in a psychosexual evaluation, many of 
which may give rise to expert opinions that are highly prejudicial, the most obvious of 
which would be a conclusion that the client presents a high risk of re-offense and/or is 
untreatable. 
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Amendment rights or, instead, to participate in a court-ordered (non-privileged) 
evaluation. Under these circumstances, if counsel advises his client to waive his rights 
and participate in the evaluation, he turns his client's fate over to chance. This is not 
effective assistance of counsel. 
It is now well-recognized that counsel's decisions (even those that one might try 
to characterize as "strategic decisions") are unreasonable insofar as they are based on 
inadequate information, see, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524-29 (2003) (trial 
counsel's "tactical" decision not to pursue a mitigation investigation and, instead, to 
pursue an alternate strategy at sentencing, deemed to be deficient performance where 
the decision to abandon the mitigation investigation was based on insufficient 
information about the state of the mitigation evidence); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 
("[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable 
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 
investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or 
to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."). 
Thus, it ought not to be surprising that the Idaho Supreme Court has already implicitly 
recognized that an attorney renders deficient performance when he allows a 
psychological evaluation to be turned over to the district court and the State before the 
attorney even knows what that evaluation might say. In State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 
967 P.2d 702 (1998), the Supreme Court held that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object when: (1) the district court ordered the defense expert's psychiatric 
evaluation report concerning the defendant be appended to the pre-sentence 
investigation report, and (2) the State called the defense's psychiatric expert to offer 
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testimony in aggravation at the defendant's sentencing hearing. Critically, in discussing 
the defense expert's report, the Idaho Supreme Court held that counsel rendered 
deficient performance in failing to object to its inclusion in the pre-sentence investigation 
report because "the [psychiatric] report had not been completed and its contents could 
not be known" to counsel, id. at 97, 967 P .2d at 711, and, "[a]lthough there are 
instances in which defense counsel properly would not object, knowing that contents of 
the report are favorable to the defendant, in this case the report had not been written 
and [counsel] did not know whether it would be favorable or unfavorable," id. at 101, 
967 P.3d at 715. Thus, in Wood, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that defense 
counsel cannot make an informed decision as to whether the contents of a 
psychological evaluation (of which a psychosexual evaluation is undoubtedly a 
specialized form) should be disclosed to the State or the sentencing court without first 
ascertaining the contents of that evaluation. 
Since an independent (confidential) psychosexual evaluation could have been 
potentially beneficial to Mr. Gonzales, and because there is no valid strategic or tactical 
reason for defense counsel to forego such an evaluation, by presenting evidence that 
his counsel failed to obtain such an evaluation, Mr. Gonzales has presented prima facie 
evidence that his counsel rendered deficient performance in this case. 
b) Mr. Gonzales Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of Prejudice 
Although Mr. Gonzales certainly cannot speculate that an independent 
psychosexual evaluation would have drawn Dr. Smith's report into question or provided 
significant mitigating evidence, it is nevertheless clear that counsel's approach of 
foregoing an independent (privileged) evaluation in favor of the court-ordered (non-
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privileged) evaluation was extremely prejudicial under the facts of this case. Based on 
the existing record, it is reasonable to infer that, had counsel obtained an independent 
evaluation, any resulting report would have turned out to be just as unflattering as the 
report prepared by Dr. Smith and, therefore, competent counsel would have kept that 
report confidential and advised his client to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights during the 
court-ordered evaluation. Thus, neither Dr. Smith's extremely prejudicial report (see 
generally PSE (revealing additional crimes and victims, a pattern of abuse, minimization 
and a lack of empathy on Mr. Gonzales' part and a moderate risk of re-offense); 
Polygraph Report), nor any similar report, would have been considered by the district 
court at sentencing. And, as noted above, the district court clearly relied quite heavily 
on Dr. Smith's very damaging report. (See No, 36625 R., p.47; see, e.g., No. 35211 
Sent. Tr., p.16, Ls.7-9, p.16, L.20 - p.18, L.10.) 
The fact that the district court has stated, after the fact, that it would have 
imposed the same sentence upon Mr. Gonzales, even absent the damning PSE by 
Dr. Smith, is of no consequence to the prejudice analysis in the present case. The 
United States Supreme Court made it clear in Strickland that, in order to establish25 
"prejudice," it need not be shown "that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not 
altered the outcome in the case" since the "result of a proceeding can be rendered 
unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot 
be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Instead, it need only be shown "that there is a 
25 This Court must keep in mind that, at the summary dismissal stage, Mr. Gonzales 
was not required to establish, i.e., prove, anything; his only responsibility was to present 
prima facie evidence. 
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reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. Clearly, this standard leaves no 
room for the subjective, post hoc rationalizations of the sentencing judge. Indeed, as 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ably explained: 
A trial judge's post-hoc statements conceming how additional evidence 
might have affected its ruling are not determinative for purposes of 
assessing prejudice. Indeed, in Strickland, the trial judge who sentenced 
the petitioner to death testified during federal habeas proceedings that the 
additional evidence would not have caused him to rule differently. See 
[Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.] at 678-79, 104 S.Ct. at 2060; 
Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir.1982). The 
Supreme Court held that this testimony was "irrelevant to the prejudice 
inquiry." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S.Ct. at 2071. The Court made 
clear that the assessment should be based on an objective standard that 
presumes a reasonable decisionmaker. Id. at 695, 104 S.C!. at 2068. 
Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2008).26 
In light of the Strickland standard, it ought not to be surprising that, in Estrada v. 
State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court explained that a 
showing that a damaging psychosexual evaluation (placed before the court due to the 
deficient performance of counsel) "play[ed] an important role in the sentencing," is 
sufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. Assuming then that 
Strickland and Estrada still control,27 it is readily apparent that Mr. Gonzales has at least 
26 Furthermore, to the extent that the sentencing judge's subjective, after-the-fact 
explanation of what sentence he would have handed down under an alternate set of 
facts might be relevant, his explanation is not a question of law which could be resolved 
through summary disposition proceedings; his testimony creates a question of fact, 
which could only be resolved at a contested evidentiary hearing. 
27 Mr. Gonzales is not unmindful of the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in Hughes v. 
State, 138 Idaho 448, 224 P.3d 515 (Ct. App. 2010). In that case, despite the plain 
language of Estrada, the Court of Appeals rejected the notion "that the Estrada 
Court ... [held] that the level of the sentencing court's reliance on the PSE was the only 
factor in analyzing prejudice," Hughes, 148 Idaho at 464, 224 P.3d at 531, and it went 
on to create a new three-part test, which took into account: (1) the degree to which the 
psychosexual evaluation was materially unfavorable, (2) the degree to which the 
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made out a prima facie case of prejudice since: the district court specifically 
acknowledged its heavy reliance on the PSE (both at the time of sentencing (see, e.g., 
No. 35211 Sent. Tr., p.16, Ls.20-21, p.17, Ls.1-3) and in dismissing Mr. Gonzales' post-
conviction petition (see No. 36625 R., p,47)); it made specific, repeated references to 
Dr. Smith's report in imposing sentence (see, e.g., No. 35211 Sent. Tr., p.16, Ls.21-25, 
p.10, Ls.10-19); and, viewing the district court's sentencing comments as a whole, it 
sentencing court relied upon the evaluation, and (3) the totality of the evidence before 
the sentencing court, id. at 464-65, 531-32. Despite the Court of Appeals' claim that the 
third factor in its new test "does not shift [its] analysis to a determination of whether the 
sentence imposed is supported by the evidence," and, instead, merely calls for a 
determination of "whether it can be said, considering all of the evidence before the 
sentencing court, that there is a reasonable probability that the PSE resulted in a 
greater sentence," id. at 465, 224 P.3d 532, the Court of Appeals appears to have gone 
on to do precisely that, see id. at 465-69, 224 P.3d at 532-36. Although the Court of 
Appeals recognized that the psychosexual evaluation was very unfavorable to the 
petitioner, and that it had been relied upon by the sentencing court, it highlighted the 
fact that the sentencing judge had discussed the petitioner's crimes and had opined that 
those crimes showed that the petitioner was "evil," and it offered the following 
conclusory statement related to its weighing of the evidence: 
We have considered the extent and character of any admissions by 
Hughes and conclusions based thereon in the PSE, the extent· of the 
sentencing court's reliance on the PSE which can be demonstrated from 
the record, and the totality of the evidence before the sentencing court. 
From this review, we cannot say that there is a reasonable probability that, 
absent the PSE, Hughes would have received a more favorable sentence. 
Hughes has failed to demonstrate prejudice in satisfaction of the second 
prong of the Strickland standard. Therefore, the district court's dismissal 
of Hughes' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure 
to advise Hughes regarding his rights prior to the PSE is affirmed. 
Hughes, 148 Idaho at 468-69,224 P.2d at 535-36. 
To the extent that Hughes created a prejudice standard that is inconsistent with 
Strickland and Estrada (and Mr. Gonzales contends that it does because, the Court of 
Appeals' claims notwithstanding, it really just calls for the Court of Appeals to render a 
decision based on its own subjective belief as to what the petitioner's sentence should 
have been), it has no precedential value and ought not to be followed in this case. 
However, to the extent that the new Hughes standard has any ongoing vitality, 
Mr. Gonzales has satisfied that standard since, as noted above, the PSE in his case 
was extremely unfavorable, the district court relied almost exclusively on that PSE, and 
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appears that Dr. Smith's report was the single biggest factor underlying the prison 
sentence ultimately imposed (see No. 35211 Sent. Tr., p.15, L.19 - p.19, L.4). 
Thus, on the record that exists in this case, it is apparent that Mr. Gonzales has 
presented, at the very least, a prima facie case of prejudice in support of his claim that 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel for his attorney's failure to obtain an 
independent psychosexual evaluation. 
2. Mr. Gonzales Has Presented Prima Facie Of Ineffectiveness Based On 
Counsel's Failure To Advise Him Not To Participate In The Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Interview Or The Court-Ordered (Unprivileged) Psychosexual 
Evaluation With Dr. Smith 
As noted, in order to survive summary dismissal, a post-conviction petitioner 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must present prima facie evidence of the 
deficient performance of defense counsel, as well as some prejudice owing to that 
deficient performance. McKay v. State, _Idaho _, _ P.3d _,2010 WL 323546, *3-4 
(Jan. 29, 2010). Just as he satisfied this standard with regard to his claim that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to obtain an independent (confidential) psychosexual 
evaluation, so too has he satisfied this standard with regard to his claim that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to advise him to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights and not 
participate in the court-ordered psychosexual evaluation with Dr. Smith. 
a) Mr. Gonzales Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of Deficient 
Performance 
In Estrada, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court held that: a psychosexual 
evaluation is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, such that the defendant has a 
there can be little doubt that Dr. Smith's observations and opinions led to a longer 
sentence than would otherwise have been imposed. 
28 
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel during that stage of the 
proceeding, Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561-63, 149 P.3d at 836-38; the defendant has a 
Fifth Amendment right to silence during a psychosexual evaluation, id. at 563-64, 140 
P.3d at 838-39; and the failure of counsel to advise the defendant of his Fifth 
Amendment right to silence and advise him as to whether he should waive that right and 
submit to the psychosexual evaluation may constitute deficient performance and 
ineffective assistance of counsel, id. at 562-63, 564, 149 P.3d at 837-38, 839. On the 
latter point, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically held that "a defendant has a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel regarding ... the decision of whether to submit to a 
psychosexual exam. . .. Estrada does have a right to at least the advice of counsel 
regarding his participation in the psychosexual evaluation .... " Id. at 562-63, 837-38. 
Thus, it is clear that effective assistance of counsel not only includes informing the 
defendant of his Fifth Amendment right to silence during his psychosexual evaluation, 
but also competent advice as to whether he should invoke that right. Id. Cf., e.g., 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966) (recognizing that even after one has 
been advised of his right to silence, he still may benefit from the guiding hand of 
counsel); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) (holding that a criminal 
defendant is not only entitled to know what her plea choices are, but also advice from 
her counsel concerning what plea should actually be entered). 
As discussed above, the uncontroverted evidence in this case is that 
Mr. Gonzales' counsel never obtained an independent psychosexual evaluation for his 
client (No. 36625 R., p.8) and, thus, the most reasonable inference is that he could not 
have known what kind of damaging evidence might come out of his client's participation 
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in the court-ordered (unprivileged) evaluation with Dr. Smith. Nevertheless, counsel 
failed to advise his client not to participate in the court-ordered evaluation. (No. 36625 
R, p.8.) 
While it is difficult to imagine any situation in which it would be reasonable for a 
defense attorney, ignorant of the likely outcome of a court-ordered (unprivileged) 
psychosexual evaluation, to fail to advise his client to invoke his Fifth Amendment 
rights, such a failure is particularly egregious in a case such as this one-where 
defense counsel had reason to believe that the court-ordered evaluation would disclose 
aggravating evidence. In this case, although Mr. Gonzales had only originally been 
charged with two counts of lewd conduct (for manual-to-genital contact and oral-to-
genital contact) over a relatively brief period of time (four months) (No. 35211 R, ppA-
5), and had pled guilty to only one of those two counts-the one that was arguably less 
egregious (the instance of manual-to-genital contact) (No. 35211 Plea Tr., p.13, L.15-
p.14, L.5), and although, on the single count of rape, Mr. Gonzales had been bound 
over on the lesser offense of attempted rape (see No. 35211 R, p.30), the fact is that 
there was some reason to believe that Mr. Gonzales had engaged in a pattern of sexual 
abuse of his daughter, and that the sexual contact was more egregious than 
Mr. Gonzales had pled guilty to. Specifically, counsel had information indicating that 
Mr. Gonzales' daughter had said that she had been sexually abused virtually every 
night for a period of time, this sexual abuse included multiple instances of vaginal 
intercourse, and she perceived a threat of physical abuse if she attempted to resist her 
father's advances. (See No. 35211 R, p.? (affidavit in support of complaint, 
summarizing CARES interview with victim).) Counsel should have known that, if the 
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daughter's claims were true, there was a good chance that fact would come out in the 
court-ordered psychosexual evaluation (especially if it included a polygraph 
examination, as most psychosexual evaluations do) and that Mr. Gonzales might be 
made to appear as if he was wrongfully denying or minimizing his conduct, or was 
failing to show remorse for his actions. In light of all of this, and in light of the fact that 
counsel did not have an independent (confidential) evaluation to work from, counsel 
never should have "rolled the dice" by failing to advise his client to invoke his right to 
silence during the court-ordered evaluation. In short, counsel rendered deficient 
performance when he failed to advise Mr. Gonzales not to participate in the court-
ordered evaluation with Dr. Smith. 
b) Mr. Gonzales Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of Prejudice 
Had counsel correctly advised Mr. Gonzales to invoke his Fifth Amendment 
rights and not participate in the court-ordered (non-privileged) evaluation, Mr. Gonzales 
presumably would have followed that advice (see No. 36625 R., pp.7-8) and Dr. Smith's 
extremely prejudicial evaluation would not have been considered by the district court at 
sentencing. 
As discussed in Part I(C)(1)(b) above (and, therefore, not repeated in full herein), 
because the district court specifically acknowledged its heavy reliance on the PSE; it 
made specific, repeated references to Dr. Smith's report in imposing sentence; and, 
viewing the district court's sentencing comments as a whole, it appears that Dr. Smith's 
report was the single biggest factor underlying the prison sentence ultimately imposed, 
it is clear that Dr. Smith's report played a role in Mr. Gonzales' sentence. Therefore, 
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Mr. Gonzales has met his burden of presenting prima facie evidence of prejudice owing 
to his counsel's failure to advise him not to participate in the court-ordered evaluation. 
II. 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Gonzales' Motion For Appointment Of Counsel 
Because, At a Minimum, Mr. Gonzales Raised The Possibility Of A Valid Claim 
"A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction proceeding is 
governed by Idaho Code § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings under the 
UPCPA [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act], a court-appointed attorney 'may be 
made available' to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of representation. The 
decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion 
of the district court." Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789,792,102 P.3d 1108, 1111 
(2004). 
In Charboneau, the Supreme Court held that a post-conviction petitioner is 
entitled to the appointment of counsel "unless the trial court determines that the post-
conviction proceeding is frivolous." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P .3d at 1111 
(quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676,679,23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001)). It further held 
that the proceeding is not frivolous and, thus, counsel must be appointed, if the 
petitioner "alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim .... " Id. at 793, 102 P.3d 
at 1112 (emphasis added). 
Subsequently, in Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 152 P.3d 12 (2007), the 
Supreme Court had occasion to revisit the standard for appointment of counsel in post-
conviction cases. In that case, the Court reaffirmed the Charboneau standard: 
In deciding whether the pro se petition raises the possibility of a valid 
claim, the trial court should consider whether the facts alleged are such 
that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain 
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counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims. Although "the 
petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the 
record for possible nonfrivolous claims," Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 
679,23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001), the court should appoint counsel if the facts 
alleged raise the possibility of a valid claim. 
Swader, 143 Idaho at 654, 152 P.3d at 15. The Swader Court also made it clear that 
this standard is much lower than the standard for deciding petitions for post-conviction 
relief on their merits because, as had also been recognized in Charboneau, pro se 
petitioners generally cannot investigate or properly present their claims (regardless of 
whether those claims will ultimately be successful) without the assistance of counsel. 
Id. at 654-55, 152 P.3d 15-16. 
In light of the foregoing standards, Mr. Gonzales contends that, even if his 
verified petition for post-conviction relief, when considered along with his supporting 
affidavit and his supplemental filing, failed to present prima facie evidence of ineffective 
assistance of counsel so as to survive summary dismissal, based on the reasoning set 
forth in Part I, above (which is incorporated herein by this reference), they are sufficient 
to meet the standard for appointment of counsel, i.e., they raise the possibility of a valid 
claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Gonzales respectfully requests that the district 
court's summary dismissal order be vacated, and that his case be remanded to the 
district court for an evidentiary hearing or, at the very least, for appointment of counsel. 
DATED thi''''' day of Apeil, 2010. c:::/ ~. ... . ~ 
~~ ... ~ 
~KRLEHfiNEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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